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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-1517 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DAVID MCCLOSKEY,  
   Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 2-09-cr-00225-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Joy F. Conti 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 15, 2015 
 
Before: AMBRO, FUENTES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: April 8, 2015)  
_______________ 
 
OPINION* 
_______________ 
 
 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 
 David McCloskey challenges the procedural reasonableness of the District Court’s 
imposition of a 120-month imprisonment sentence.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
affirm.1 
I. 
 In 1999, Kenneth Cowden, an acquaintance of McCloskey, began conducting 
fraudulently inflated real estate appraisals.  Cowden circumvented Pennsylvania’s 
requirement that real estate appraisers be licensed by using other appraisers’ licenses.  
His fraudulent scheme also involved rendering inflated property values by using better 
neighborhoods for comparables and by making the property itself appear to be in much 
better condition that it actually was. 
 By late 2000 or early 2001, McCloskey was working for First Atlantic Financial 
(“First Atlantic”), a mortgage brokerage owned by his mother.  While McCloskey’s 
mother handled the payroll and directed its legal affairs, McCloskey was considered the 
day-to-day boss.  Indeed, his subordinates referred to him as “King.”  When Cowden told 
McCloskey that he was appraising real estate for other mortgage brokers, McCloskey 
urged him to do the same for First Atlantic.  In fact, McCloskey began paying Cowden 
$400 per appraisal upfront to prioritize First Atlantic’s business.   
 When Cowden provided an inflated appraisal to First Atlantic, he would write 
“Ken’s World” on the loan file to alert McCloskey that the appraisal was “beyond 
                                              
1 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The District Court 
had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  Because we write for the parties, we recite 
only those facts necessary to our conclusion. 
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reality” and that additional measures were needed to make it seem plausible.  App. 244.  
For those appraisals, McCloskey and his subordinates would create bogus supporting 
documents which would exaggerate borrowers’ income, overstate their assets, and 
mischaracterize their employment status.   
 This scheme continued until 2005, when federal agents appeared at Cowden’s 
home.  Cowden admitted his conduct, confessed that he had provided unlicensed and 
inflated appraisals to McCloskey and others at First Atlantic, and provided documents to 
substantiate his admissions.  In addition, the subordinates working with McCloskey at 
First Atlantic also confessed to receiving fraudulent appraisals from Cowden while they 
worked for McCloskey.  
 In 2009, a grand jury indicted McCloskey of conspiring to commit mail fraud with 
Cowden and others “[f]rom in and around August 2004 and continuing thereafter until in 
and around April 2005.”  App. 9A-10A.  Cowden pleaded guilty in June 2010.  At the 
plea hearing, McCloskey’s attorney clarified McCloskey was admitting only that he knew 
Cowden was an unlicensed appraiser and that McCloskey was not conceding that he 
hired Cowden to perform inflated appraisals.  The District Court questioned McCloskey 
thoroughly regarding his potential sentence noting that he could be sentenced to the 
statutory maximum for his offense, which was 20 years in prison.  The District Court 
explicitly stated: “So you understand that . . . you will still be bound by your guilty plea 
and will have no right to withdraw it even if your counsel made a mistake?,” to which 
McCloskey responded affirmatively.  App. 11.   
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 The parties then began to prepare for sentencing and an initial Presentence 
Investigation Report was prepared.  In August 2010, the Government alerted McCloskey 
that it would argue that he was responsible for the losses Cowden caused at First Atlantic 
and other brokerages.  McCloskey moved to strike the Government’s objections—which 
included its loss estimates—on the eve of the evidentiary hearing.  The District Court 
denied McCloskey’s motion to strike and held the evidentiary hearing.  After the 
evidentiary hearing, McCloskey filed a counseled motion to withdraw his guilty plea, 
asserting his innocence to the crime charged in an affidavit affixed to the motion.  App. 
361.  At a hearing on the motion, McCloskey withdrew his motion after he was reminded 
that the hearing could result in waiver of the attorney-client privilege and could 
potentially expose him to prosecution for perjury. 
 The District Court determined that, in calculating McCloskey’s advisory 
Guidelines range, his offense level should be increased to account for: (1) his leadership 
role under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a); (2) the fact that his fraud victimized more than 50 people 
under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2); (3) the sophisticated means he used to commit the fraud 
per U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C); and (4) his attempt to withdraw his guilty plea, which 
obstructed justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.  In addition, the Court found that McCloskey 
failed to demonstrate his clear acceptance of responsibility for purposes of a reduction 
under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a).  The Court did, however, grant McCloskey’s request for a 
downward variance, sentencing him to 120 months in prison.  This timely appeal 
followed. 
II. 
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 We review the procedural reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse of 
discretion standard.  When sentencing a defendant, the district court must follow a three-
step analysis set forth in Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).  First, the district 
court must correctly determine the applicable guidelines range.  Second, the court must 
determine whether to adjust the guidelines range.  Third, it must consider all the factors 
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) as a whole, including whether a variance is warranted.   
 If we find no procedural error, we must “‘then, at stage two, consider [the 
sentence’s] substantive reasonableness.’”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008)).  The 
“touchstone of ‘reasonableness’ is whether the record as a whole reflects rational and 
meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  United 
States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).   
 On appeal, McCloskey asserts two arguments: (1) that the District Court erred by 
misapplying the concept of “relevant conduct” in calculating the advisory Guidelines; 
and (2) that it erred in applying the obstruction-of-justice enhancement while refusing to 
give him credit for acceptance of responsibility.  We address each claim in turn.   
A. The District Court Did Not Err in Considering Relevant Conduct. 
 McCloskey argues that the District Court impermissibly considered conduct 
occurring prior to 2004 in determining whether to apply the leadership-role enhancement, 
the sophisticated-means enhancement, and the number-of-victims adjustment in 
calculating his offense level.  Because McCloskey concedes that he failed to preserve this 
argument, we review this claim solely for plain error.  To establish error under this 
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standard, McCloskey must prove that there was “(1) ‘error,’ (2) that is ‘plain,’ and (3) 
that [it] ‘affect[s] substantial rights.’”  Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 
(1997) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).  Further, “[i]f all 
three conditions are met, [we] may then exercise [our] discretion to notice a forfeited 
error, but only if [] the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.’”  Id. (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).         
 Here, McCloskey can prove that there was an error and that the error was plain.  
But the error was not in the District Court’s interpretation of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1) in 
determining relevant conduct, but rather in its application of this section.  As the 
Government contends, McCloskey’s substantive offense was wire fraud, which is found 
in U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(1).  Offenses governed by U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 are subject to 
grouping.  That being so, the Court should have used the definition of “relevant conduct” 
in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2), which permits it to consider “all acts and omissions described 
in subdivisions (1)(A) and (1)(B) . . . that were part of the same course of conduct or 
common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2).  
Therefore, the first two prongs of Olano are met.   
 McCloskey, however, cannot prove the error affected his substantial rights.  
Because U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) encompasses a broader range of “relevant conduct,” 
McCloskey’s claim falters.  Section 1B1.3(a)(2) defines “common scheme or plan” as 
covering conduct “substantially connected by at least one common factor, including 
common victims, common accomplices, common purpose, or similar modus operandi,” 
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and construes “same course of conduct” to mean actions “sufficiently connected or 
related to each other,” and involving factors such as “the degree of similarity in offenses, 
the regularity or number of repetitions, and the time interval between offenses.”  U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.3(a)(2) cmt. 9.  The record is clear that this scheme was connected by “at least one 
common factor”: Cowden, an unsavory real estate appraiser who operated illegally using 
other people’s licenses.  Indeed, while McCloskey argues that the District Court 
erroneously relied on the testimony of subordinates who ceased working at First Atlantic 
in 2003, this argument is belied by the fact that McCloskey continued the fraud with new 
employees and the same modus operandi.  Accordingly, McCloskey fails to prove the 
District Court’s error affected his substantial rights in applying U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1) 
and considering pre-indictment conduct as “relevant conduct.”  The District Court was 
entitled to rely on this conduct in applying the leadership role, sophisticated means, and 
number-of-victims enhancements.  
B. The District Court Did Not Err in Declining to Credit McCloskey for Acceptance 
of Responsibility and Applying an Obstruction-of-Justice Enhancement. 
 We now turn to McCloskey’s second argument: that the District Court erred in 
failing to credit him for acceptance of responsibility, while applying an obstruction-of-
justice enhancement for his withdrawn guilty plea.  These arguments were preserved and 
we review them for clear error.  United States v. Siddons, 660 F.3d 699, 707-08 (3d Cir. 
2011).  A finding is only clearly erroneous “when, although there is evidence to support 
it, the reviewing body on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction 
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that a mistake has been committed.”  Grier, 475 F.3d at 570 (internal alterations and 
citations omitted). 
 McCloskey argues that the obstruction-of-justice enhancement for withdrawing his 
guilty plea was inappropriate.  The Guidelines authorize an increase in a defendant’s 
offense level if he “willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, 
the administration of justice with respect to the [. . .] prosecution.”  U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.  
Furthermore, this enhancement applies to defendants who commit perjury.  Id. cmt. 
n.4(B).  When applying U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, “the court should be cognizant that inaccurate 
testimony or statements sometimes may result from confusion, mistake, or fault memory 
and, thus, not all inaccurate testimony or statements necessarily reflect a willful attempt 
to obstruct justice.”  Id. cmt. n.2.     
 McCloskey does not deny that the sworn statements he made in his affidavit were 
false.  Instead, he asserts that, “[i]t is not unreasonable for confusion to set in after [he] 
pleaded guilty believing one set of facts to be true only to find out after the guilty plea 
that the stakes have been exponentially raised.”  Appellant’s Br. 47.  He contends he “did 
not intend to obstruct justice by filing a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and asserting 
his innocence.”  Id.  McCloskey’s assertions of “confusion” and “fear,” however, fail.  
McCloskey was not confused that he was providing false testimony.  Rather, he knew his 
testimony was false when he was giving it.  A defendant who perjures himself in an 
attempt to withdraw his guilty plea obstructs justice.  Thus, the District Court did not err 
in applying this enhancement. 
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 Finally, we turn to McCloskey’s argument that the District Court failed to credit 
him for acceptance of responsibility for his offense under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.  The 
Guidelines permit a court to credit a defendant where he “clearly demonstrates acceptance 
of responsibility for his offense.”  U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.  A defendant who enters a guilty plea, 
however, is not entitled to this credit “as a matter of right.”  Id. cmt. n.3.  Moreover, 
“conduct resulting in an enhancement under § 3C1.1 (Obstructing or Impeding the 
Administration of Justice) ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted 
responsibility for his criminal conduct.”  Id. cmt. n.4.  As the Guidelines note, there may 
be “extraordinary cases” in which adjustments under § 3C1.1 and § 3E1.1 apply.  Id.   
 To determine whether McCloskey’s case is “extraordinary,” the District Court 
appropriately reviewed the totality of the circumstances.  In doing so, the Court explained 
that McCloskey’s “obstructive conduct occurred long after the investigation in this case, 
required the government to file a lengthy response, required the court to hold a hearing, 
and further delayed resolution of the proceedings.”  App. 495-96.  Significantly, we join 
the District Court in noting that McCloskey “has not yet admitted his obstructive 
conduct.”  Thus, while we commend McCloskey for abandoning his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea, we ultimately hold that the District Court did not err in refusing to apply 
this enhancement.   
III. 
 For all the reasons stated above, we affirm the District Court’s sentence. 
